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Abstract
Since Tocqueville linked the quality of democracy in America to its vibrant 
civic culture, studies have explored the relationship between social capital 
and the quality of governance. Yet, few have examined the mechanisms 
between individual components of social capital and democracy in depth. 
This study focuses on the link between one component of social capital, civil 
society engagement, and the linkage between public opinion and policy. It 
argues that engagement in associations with an interest in the policy issue 
may stimulate correspondence between public opinion and policy through 
their ability to collect and disseminate information to policy makers and 
the public. The analysis of 20 specific policy issues from 30 European 
countries confirms these expectations: Issues that experience a high level 
of associational engagement display a stronger relationship between public 
opinion and policy. The findings underline the role civil society organizations 
can play in policy representation beyond engaging in interest advocacy.
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Introduction
Since De Tocqueville (1840) linked the quality of democracy in America to 
its vibrant civic culture, scholars have argued that civic participation and net-
works of cooperation and trust in society have important benefits for the 
quality of democracy. The most prominent example of this argument is per-
haps presented in Putnam’s work on social capital. Together with norms of 
reciprocity and trust, he considers social networks as one of the building 
blocks that help improve the democratic performance of a society on a range 
of different indicators (Putnam, 1993, 2000). Among other beneficial conse-
quences, such as teaching democratic norms and recruiting political leaders, 
participation in civil society organizations is assumed to provide a mecha-
nism for citizens to channel their preferences toward political elites and, ulti-
mately, to have their views represented.
A large body of literature examines the link between associational engage-
ment on one hand and various aspects of government performance (see, for 
example, Andrews, 2011; Cusack, 1999; Putnam, 1993) as well as citizens’ 
ability to keep governments politically accountable on the other (see, for 
example, Claibourn & Martin, 2007; Jottier & Heyndels, 2012). However, 
there is limited systematic evidence regarding the effect of associational 
engagement on the link between opinion and policy, which is an indicator of 
policy representation and hence a key aspect of the democratic process. Verba 
and Nie’s (1972) study of participation in American communities constitutes 
a milestone in this respect as it explicitly examines whether communal par-
ticipation affects priority congruence between citizens and leaders (see also 
Hansen, 1975; Hill & Matsubayashi, 2005).
Yet, it is possible that it is not the overall engagement in all kinds of asso-
ciations concerned with different issues that is relevant when it comes to rep-
resentation in specific areas of policy. An important way in which civil society 
organizations might affect the opinion–policy linkage is by providing infor-
mation that helps citizens become “sophisticated consumers of politics” (Boix 
& Posner, 1998, p. 690) and policy makers to find out about public prefer-
ences. However, as associations have specific purposes and goals, they are 
likely to provide information primarily about issues that are relevant for their 
activities. Hence, engagement in issue-relevant organizations rather than asso-
ciational life as a whole may be the determining factor when it comes to facili-
tating the transmission of information between voters and politicians and, 
ultimately, strengthening the link between public opinion and policy.
We test this hypothesis through multilevel regression analysis on a data 
set of opinion and policy on 20 specific policy issues in 30 European coun-
tries. The issues fall into a broad range of different policy areas, while the 
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countries cover almost the entire European continent and feature high levels 
of variation in important political institutions. Using data with variation at 
both the country and the issue level is crucial as issue-specific civil society 
engagement varies at both levels and because it allows us to control for a 
range of variables at both levels. Our findings deliver strong support for the 
argument that associational engagement in the relevant issue jurisdiction is 
an important predictor of the strength of the opinion–policy link. While 
overall associational engagement in a country is also positively related to 
policy representation, the effect disappears when the domain-specific mea-
sure is introduced.
Our findings underline the value of integrating research on engagement in 
voluntary associations with research on policy representation. They support 
the popular claim that civic engagement can improve the quality of democ-
racy and advance our knowledge about the specific channels through which 
the two are linked. While the vibrancy of civil society might positively affect 
democracy in various ways, we show that the benefits for policy representa-
tion as a particular aspect of democratic governance appear to be limited to 
the particular issue domain in which civil society associations are active. 
Therefore, it is most likely that associations affect representation through the 
transmission of issue-specific information rather than the overall associa-
tional engagement in a country.
In addition, the study contributes to the literature that examines the factors 
influencing the quality of policy representation (e.g., Hobolt & Klemmensen, 
2008; Kang & Powell, 2010; Lax & Phillips, 2009, 2012; Peters & Ensink, 
2014; Rasmussen, Romeijn, & Toshkov, 2018; Toshkov, Mäder, & Rasmussen, 
2018; Wlezien, 2005). It provides a new perspective to the more common view 
of associations as lobbyists by focusing on the role that civil society associa-
tions active on an issue play regardless of their policy positions. The positive 
effect that associational engagement exerts on the opinion–policy link persists 
even when we control for the net support for a given policy in the community 
of associations. Consequently, when debating the potential of advocacy groups 
to push for policy that is contrary to the views of the public, we also need to 
take into account that their actions might (even if unintended) simultaneously 
promote the link between public opinion and policy.
Civil Society Engagement and the Opinion–Policy 
Link
The argument that the quality and amount of social interactions in a society 
influence the possibility of individuals to achieve their goals and influence 
democratic governance was popularized by Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988, 
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1990), and more recently by Putnam’s studies of social capital in Italy (1993) 
and the United States (2000). Social capital is generally understood as com-
prising (a) engagement in civil society organizations, which is marked by and 
promotes (b) norms of reciprocity and (c) generalized interpersonal trust 
(Putnam, 1993). These different facets are expected to influence democracy in 
a variety of ways (see, for example, Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993). For instance, 
trust and reciprocity are said to facilitate cooperation and reduce free riding, 
thereby increasing citizens’ ability to stand up against political elites who 
exploit their power. Moreover, associations are argued to be beneficial because 
they serve as a training ground for political leaders (Paxton, 2002).
A range of studies have tested whether social capital does in fact influence 
democracy, usually analyzing the relationships between broad indicators of 
trust, associational engagement, and democracy (see, for example, Andrews, 
2011; Claibourn & Martin, 2007; Cusack, 1999; Jottier & Heyndels, 2012; 
Paxton, 2002; Putnam, 1993). While such a holistic approach undoubtedly 
yields valuable insights, it does not necessarily advance our understanding of 
which of the various proposed mechanisms are actually at work (Andrews, 
2012). Therefore, several scholars have taken more nuanced approaches and 
investigated different mechanisms that potentially link social capital and 
democracy (e.g., Jottier & Heyndels, 2012, on accountability; Griesshaber & 
Geys, 2012, on associations and corruption; and Knack, 2002, on different 
indicators of government performance).
We aim to contribute to this endeavor by focusing on the relationship 
between engagement in civil society organizations and policy representation. 
The representation of citizen preferences in the adopted policies is a key aspect 
and goal of contemporary democratic governance (Dahl, 1989). Accordingly, 
a large body of political science literature is devoted to studying the direct 
linkage between opinion and policy (e.g., Bevan & Jennings, 2014; Hobolt & 
Klemmensen, 2008; Lax & Phillips, 2012; Page & Shapiro, 1983; Rasmussen, 
Reher, & Toshkov, 2018; Toshkov et al., 2018; Wlezien, 1995). The literature 
also examines what factors affect the strength of this relationship, paying most 
attention to political institutions and issue salience (e.g., Hobolt & 
Klemmensen, 2008; Kang & Powell, 2010; Lax & Phillips, 2009, 2012; 
Monroe, 1998; Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov, 2018; Wlezien & Soroka, 
2012).1 The expectation that a particular factor will strengthen the opinion–
policy link is usually based on its potential to increase either the capacity or 
the incentive (or both) of policy makers to respond to public opinion.
The potential role of civil society organizations is largely neglected in 
this literature (for recent reviews, see Bevan & Rasmussen, 2017; Burstein, 
2014; Rasmussen, Mäder, & Reher, 2018). The few studies that do include 
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associations tend to take an advocacy perspective, meaning that they view 
civil society organizations as interest groups that seek to influence policy. 
The predominant hypothesis is then that they can either strengthen or weaken 
the link between public opinion and policy, depending on whether the pref-
erences of these groups are aligned with those of the public. As an example, 
a recent study of 39 policies in the U.S. states showed that congruence 
between opinion and policy was higher when interest groups and the public 
were aligned (Lax & Phillips, 2012). Moreover, Gilens’s (2012) analysis of 
1,779 U.S. policy issues found a higher likelihood that policy changes sup-
ported by the public are adopted when the powerful interest groups are also 
positive toward these changes.
Our theoretical argument takes a different perspective on the role of civil 
society organizations in policy representation by focusing on their “informa-
tional carrying capacity” (Claibourn & Martin, 2007, p. 200), which helps the 
public form policy preferences and political elites to learn about them. We 
thereby attempt to bridge the gap between existing research of policy repre-
sentation and the literature on civil society engagement. According to this 
argument, the presence of associations may increase the likelihood of policy 
representation no matter whether the views of associations and the public are 
aligned. On the one hand, associations help policy makers respond to citizens 
by making information about public opinion regarding policy issues that lie 
within the realm of their purpose and interests available to them. They do so 
both directly, by actively conveying information to policy makers, and indi-
rectly, by placing issues on the public agenda, for instance, through political 
action and media presence (see, for example, Austen-Smith & Wright, 1994; 
Burstein & Linton, 2002; Kollman, 1998; Milbraith, 1960; Naurin, 2007; 
Rasmussen, Carroll, & Lowery, 2014; Schlozman, Verba, & Brady, 2012; see 
also Agnone, 2007, on social movements).
In a world in which decision makers face cognitive, time, and informa-
tion constraints (Jones, 2003; Simon, 1991), such associational engagement 
is likely to increase their awareness of public preferences on an issue. 
Consequently, they will be better able to increase the link between public 
opinion and policy by passing or maintaining policy in line with the views 
of the majority of citizens or by making efforts to convince citizens of the 
policies they consider to be in the public’s best interest, thereby achieving 
representation “from above” (Esaiasson & Holmberg, 1996).
There is of course always the possibility that associations are somewhat 
selective in which information they provide and, therefore, present a dis-
torted view. Yet, Wright (1996) mentions how “any group that exaggerates, 
distorts, or does not fully reveal what it truthfully knows risks exposure by a 
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competing group that presents the facts accurately. Competition among 
interest groups, therefore, is crucial for keeping groups honest” (p. 201). 
Thus, while “it cannot be claimed that interest groups would never misrep-
resent the facts [. . .] there are strong incentives for them not to do so” (p. 
200). Moreover, even if individual civil society organizations only present a 
partial perspective, strong engagement on one side on an issue is likely to be 
followed by countermobilization and action by opposing groups (Truman, 
1951). Decision makers are thus likely to obtain information about the pref-
erences of different sections of the public. In addition, the vast majority of 
associations in which we study engagement are not classic examples of 
interest groups that represent narrow constituencies of specialist interests 
(Olson, 1971). Instead, they often speak on behalf of broad-based constitu-
encies representing diffuse interests of large sections of society, such as con-
sumer and environmental groups (Bevan, Baumgartner, Johnson, & 
McCarthy, 2013). Therefore, we argue that associational activity is likely to 
improve the ability of representatives to be responsive to the citizens, regard-
less of the policy positions that the groups themselves hold on the issue in 
question.
On the other hand, civil society organizations support the formation of 
informed policy preferences among the public. They supply citizens with 
information about the issues in which they have an interest, thereby turning 
them into what Boix and Posner (1998) have referred to as “sophisticated 
consumers of politics” (p. 690; see also Burstein & Linton, 2002). According 
to Wright (1996), associations “monitor, evaluate, and even shape percep-
tions of how well incumbents are doing their job” (p. 91). They oversee and 
scrutinize elites’ statements and actions concerning policy issues and trans-
mit this information to their members, for instance through internal media 
(Cohen, 2012), as well as to the wider public by engaging in different types 
of outsider lobbying, that is, attempts to mobilize citizens outside the politi-
cal system to put pressure on the political insiders (Kollman, 1998; Wright, 
1996). As a result, citizens are better able to hold policy makers accountable. 
As Jottier and Heyndels (2012) showed, associational engagement, together 
with other components of social capital, enables voters to base their vote 
choice more strongly on their assessment of which party is most likely to 
implement their policy preferences. Through their informational role, civil 
society organizations can thus put pressure on political elites to take the 
opinions of the broader segments of society they represent into consider-
ation. Therefore, like other factors that have been argued to affect policy 
representation, associational engagement should increase both the ability 
and the incentives of elites to be responsive and thereby strengthen the link 
between opinion and policy.
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General Versus Issue-Specific Effects of Civil Society 
Engagement
A small number of studies have developed and tested similar arguments to 
the one put forth here. Verba and Nie (1972) found in their classic study of 
Participation in America (see also Hansen, 1975) that cooperative participa-
tion, which captures active membership in voluntary associations as well as 
more informal cooperative community engagement (Verba & Nie, 1972, p. 
58), is positively related with congruence between citizen and elite policy 
priorities. However, this relationship only exists in communities with high 
levels of consensus between active and inactive citizens and in contexts with 
high voter turnout (Verba & Nie, 1972, pp. 325-327). Later, Berry, Portney, 
and Thomson (1993) demonstrated that engagement in neighborhood asso-
ciations has a positive effect on the ability of citizens to communicate their 
wishes to public officials in five U.S. cities when it comes to both placing 
neighborhood issues on the agenda and getting actual policy adopted. Rather 
than looking at associational engagement as a whole, Hill and Matsubayashi 
(2005) differentiated between “bridging” and “bonding” voluntary associa-
tions, which might affect representation differently (Putnam, 2000). Bonding 
associations represent homogeneous groups of actors, whereas bridging asso-
ciations cut across class divisions and cultural identities. However, they did 
not find the expected positive effect of membership in bridging associations 
on priority congruence between citizens and elites.
Gray et al. (2004) tested a similar argument within the interest group litera-
ture. They assess whether the density of the interest community, which com-
prises both nonprofit and for-profit organizations lobbying for their policy 
interests, affects the representation of public opinion in policy irrespective of the 
groups’ policy positions. A denser interest community, they argue, “might pro-
vide politicians a more precise representation of interests in society” (p. 413). At 
the same time, “a crowded system may clog-up the policy process, inducing 
gridlock” and thus weaken representation (p. 413). They find evidence of a posi-
tive effect for one of the two years under investigation.
While these studies have argued that civil society groups can influence 
policy representation and hence the democratic process by providing infor-
mation to citizens and policy makers, they all remain agnostic with regard to 
the specific purposes and policy interests of associations. In contrast, we 
expect the effect of associations on representation to be largely restricted to 
the policy issues that lie within the realm of interest of a particular associa-
tion. No matter how encompassing the membership of associations is, they 
are likely to affect the information environment primarily on issues that are 
relevant for their purpose. This idea also drives recent work by Bevan and 
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Rasmussen (2017) and Cohen (2012) who argue that associations have the 
potential to help citizens set the agenda and hold leaders accountable with 
respect to the issues in which the groups are interested. Even high levels of 
engagement in groups are unlikely to strengthen substantive representation in 
policy areas that are unrelated to their specific goals and interests; for 
instance, environmental associations are unlikely to transmit information 
about workers’ rights. Instead, primarily associations for whom the issue is 
relevant can be expected to increase the flow of information from decision 
makers to citizens. Our hypothesis is thus that the higher the engagement in 
voluntary associations linked to a policy issue, the stronger the link between 
public opinion and policy on this issue.
Data and Method
Testing our hypothesis requires data on policy representation and associa-
tional engagement with variation across both policy issues and countries. We 
created a unique data set containing information on public support for 20 
specific policy issues and the status of legislation on these issues in 30 
European countries,2 allowing us to measure the strength of the relationship 
between public opinion and policy across issues and countries. We link this 
data on policy representation to information about engagement in different 
types of voluntary associations across the countries.
Public Opinion and Policy
The unit of analysis in our study is a policy in a country. Among the data 
required to test our hypotheses, public opinion on a set of policy issues 
across a large number of countries is the most difficult to obtain. We there-
fore made the collection of these data our starting point. To assemble a 
sample of policy issues on which public opinion data are available across 
countries, we searched major cross-national surveys of representative sam-
ples of the population conducted between 1998 and 2013 that include at 
least 15 European countries for questions measuring attitudes toward spe-
cific policy issues. All included questions fulfill a number of criteria: They 
concern issues of national (as opposed to EU) competence, measure respon-
dent attitudes to the policy on an agreement scale, and allow us to deter-
mine whether the policy was in place at the time the survey question was 
asked (i.e., questions concerning future policy changes, such as increases in 
spending, are excluded). From this set of issues, we selected a sample of 20 
survey items (Table 1; Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov, 2018; Reher, 2018). 
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Table 1. Policy Issues and Related Voluntary Associations.
Policy issue Associations
Warnings on alcoholic drink bottles Health and patient organizations
Experiments on animals Environmental and animal rights organizations
Smoking bans in bars and pubs Health and patient organizations
Tobacco vending machines Health and patient organizations
Embryonic stem cell research Religious organizations, health and patient 
organizations
Nuclear power Environmental and animal rights organizations
Nationwide minimum wage Trade unions, business and industry 
associations
Support for caregivers Health and patient organizations, elderly 
rights organizations
Detaining terrorist suspects 
without charge
Human rights organizations
Same-sex marriage Religious organizations, human rights 
organizations
Adoption of children by same-sex 
couples
Religious organizations, human rights 
organizations
Abortion Religious organizations, human rights 
organizations
Citizenship (Ius soli) —
Progressive income tax Trade unions, business and industry 
associations
Right to earn while receiving a 
pension
Trade unions, business and industry 
associations, elderly rights organizations
Asylum seekers’ right to work Human rights organizations
Online voting —
Military involvement in Afghanistan Human rights organizations
Mandatory retirement age Trade unions, business and industry 
associations, elderly rights organizations
Disposal of plastic waste in landfills Environmental and animal rights 
organizations
We ensured that these issues represent a variety of different policy areas. 
The appendix includes a list of the policy issues as well information about 
the year, the specific survey, and the number of countries included.3
Subsequently, we mapped the state of policy on the issues in the different 
countries at the time point at which the degree of public support for the poli-
cies was measured in the opinion polls. For each issue, we conducted a search 
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for information in documents published by government agencies, interna-
tional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, academic publications, 
newspaper articles, and so forth. Whenever possible, information obtained 
from one source was verified by another, independent source and in cases of 
doubt experts were consulted, for instance, academics and public servants. 
Policy was coded on scales constructed for each issue, which were trans-
formed into ordinal scales with three levels, where 0 indicates that the policy 
was not in place, 1 that it was partially in place, and 2 that it was in place. As 
an example, for the issue of adoption rights of same-sex couples, 0 means that 
they are banned from adopting children, 1 means that they may adopt inter-
nally, that is, one partner may adopt the child of the other partner, and 2 
means that the couple may also adopt externally, that is, a child to whom 
neither partner is a parent (cf. Online Appendix A; Rasmussen, Reher, & 
Toshkov, 2018; Reher, 2018).
To measure the quality of policy representation, we regress the policy 
measure on the degree of public support for it. Public support is measured as 
the proportion of survey respondents in a country who indicated to be in favor 
of the policy among all respondents who indicated to be either in favor or 
against it (those who responded “neither nor” or “don’t know” are excluded). 
We are explicitly agnostic as to whether public opinion moves policy or 
whether policy moves public opinion, which is reflected in our decision to 
measure opinion and policy at the same point in time. Both processes might 
lead to a positive relationship between the two, and it is also possible that 
external forces, such as events or the media, move both public opinion and 
policy. Our approach to policy representation is that it can occur in different 
ways and that a top-down process of opinion formation need not be seen as 
opinion manipulation by elites. Citizens’ policy preferences are generally 
based on some kind of information and not, as Holmberg (2011) put it, “born 
via some sort of immaculate conception, without the imprint of external opin-
ion molders” (p. 54). Assuming that citizens are capable of evaluating politi-
cal elites’ claims and arguments equally well as information stemming from 
other sources, public opinion formation through policy makers can be consid-
ered a legitimate part of the democratic representation process (Esaiasson & 
Holmberg, 1996). Descriptive statistics for public opinion and policy can be 
found in the Online Appendix A.
Associational Engagement
We obtained data on engagement in civil society organizations from the same 
set of cross-national surveys from which we selected the policy issues. We 
use items from eight surveys4 conducted between 1998 and 2011, which ask 
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respondents in which type(s) of association they are members and/or engaged 
and which use similar categories of associations. We match each policy issue 
to one or more association types with an interest in the issue (Table 1). As the 
item wording varies across surveys and because they do not cover all years, 
we calculate the mean engagement levels per country for each policy issue 
across all eight surveys. The resulting variable, specific associational engage-
ment, indicates the proportion of survey respondents in a country who indi-
cated to be engaged in one of the association types linked to the policy issue, 
averaged across surveys.
When several association types are linked to an issue, the scores are added, 
so that the measure indicates the cumulative proportions of citizens who are 
engaged. As a result, engagement in several types of organizations per 
respondent may be included in the measure. This procedure reflects our inter-
est in the strength of the associations rather than in the engagement levels of 
individual citizens. As most association types have low engagement levels 
and few have high levels, we use the natural logarithm of the cumulative 
proportion (+0.01; see Online Appendix A for descriptives). The level of 
engagement across countries is 0 for the issues of citizenship and online vot-
ing, which have no associated organizations, and highest for the right to earn 
a salary while receiving a pension.
To substantiate the argument that issue-specific associations in particular 
are important in transmitting policy-related information, we also create a 
measure of general associational engagement. Our indicator is based on the 
same data and indicates the average number of association types in which a 
respondent is engaged in a country.5 Controlling for this variable enables us 
to test whether it is indeed the strength of issue-specific associations rather 
than general civic engagement that increases the quality of policy representa-
tion. The measures of general and issue-specific associational engagement 
are only correlated at Pearson’s r = .50, indicating that they measure distinct 
aspects of associational engagement.
Control Variables
We include several control variables in our models. First, we examine 
whether the salience of an issue influences the link between opinion and 
policy by interacting a measure of media salience with public opinion. The 
salience of an issue in the media might affect the ability of both politicians 
and citizens to acquire information about each other’s preferences and 
behavior on an issue. It can therefore be expected that salience also has a 
positive impact on the ability of citizens to hold politicians accountable for 
their policy actions (see, for example, Lax & Phillips, 2012). We construct 
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an indicator of the overall media salience for each specific issue across 
Europe based on the relative number of articles in the Financial Times’ cov-
erage of Europe that concern the policy issue over a 3-year period, using the 
year of the survey item as the final one.6 While the Financial Times clearly 
does not devote equal amounts of attention to the public debates in all coun-
tries in Europe, the measure has the advantage of not being endogenous to 
policy adoption in a country, which is likely to be covered by the media (for 
a similar argument regarding the United States, see Lax & Phillips, 2012). 
The lack of between-country variation in the measure is moreover not overly 
problematic because the main contribution of this study is to test whether the 
relationship between civil society engagement and policy representation is 
issue-specific, which is why it is particularly important to control for factors 
that might account for variation in the degree of both engagement and repre-
sentation between issues.
An alternative way of measuring the public salience of a policy issue 
would be to rely on respondents’ replies to the survey question about the 
“most important problem” (MIP) facing their country. Yet, while this survey 
item is frequently used to measure issue salience, it is problematic for our 
study that the categories into which the mentioned issues are divided are 
much broader than the issues on which we measure opinion and policy 
(Monroe, 1998, p. 20, who uses such an approach, also highlights this mis-
match). For instance, policy on the disposal of plastic waste would be consid-
ered as salient as environmental issues overall, which is likely to be an 
overestimation, whereas the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan was prob-
ably more salient at some point than foreign policy more generally. Despite 
these reasons for using the policy-specific, media-based measure of salience 
instead, we also conduct robustness checks with an MIP-based indicator (see 
Online Appendix C).
Importantly, engagement in civil society associations is only modestly 
correlated with the media-based measure of salience (r = .22, p < .001) and 
uncorrelated with the MIP-based measure, indicating that associational 
engagement is not simply a proxy for salience. Whereas engagement in asso-
ciations may increase when issues become more salient, its drivers are far 
more complex in practice and linked to a number of other factors besides the 
public salience of an issue (see also Curtis, Baer, & Grabb, 2001).
Second, we interact a measure of generalized social trust with the public 
opinion variable to account for the possibility that the creation of interper-
sonal trust in civil society associations might be responsible for the rela-
tionship between associational engagement and policy representation. As 
social trust is another component of the broader concept of social capital 
that is both closely linked to associational engagement and frequently 
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argued to affect the quality of democracy (Putnam, 1993), it is important to 
control for its potential effect. The measure is the country average of social 
trust based on an item included in the six European Social Surveys (ESS) 
conducted between 2002 and 2012. It measures trust on an 11-point scale, 
ranging from you cannot be too careful in dealing with people to most peo-
ple can be trusted.
The political institution that is most commonly believed to influence 
representation is the electoral system. Rules that translate the percentage of 
votes more proportionally into seats have for a long time been assumed to 
produce better representation (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; Lijphart, 
1984; Powell, 2000). Yet, there are also reasons to believe that majoritarian 
systems lead to better representation, for instance, because they tend to 
produce single-party governments with less need to compromise (Wlezien 
& Soroka, 2012). At this point, the empirical evidence is as inconclusive as 
the theoretical discussion, and particularly the role of electoral rules in cit-
izen–government congruence on the left–right dimension remains fiercely 
debated (Blais & Bodet, 2006; Ferland, 2016; Golder & Lloyd, 2014; 
Powell, 2009). We control for a potential effect of electoral rules on repre-
sentation by interacting public opinion with a measure of the effective num-
ber of parliamentary parties (ENPP), developed by Golder (2005) and later 
extended by Bormann and Golder (2013; cf. Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). The 
composition of parliament is thought to be an important mechanism through 
which electoral rules, such as district magnitude and electoral thresholds, 
may affect representation.
We also estimate models that include additional interaction terms between 
public opinion and institutions, namely, the legislative–executive balance, 
federalism, bicameralism, and EU membership. The inclusion of these con-
trol variables does not change our findings (see Online Appendix D). We 
furthermore interact public opinion with a continuous year variable to account 
for potential time trends in the opinion–policy link. This is also important 
because the data for later years tend to include more countries and, in particu-
lar, more Central and Eastern European countries as several of the surveys 
were conducted among the EU member states at the time.
Finally, it is important that we address a particularly powerful alterna-
tive way in which civil society associations might influence policy, and 
hence the link between public opinion and policy: interest advocacy. It is 
plausible that the presence of strong civil society organizations supporting 
a policy, and potentially lobbying policy makers, increases the likelihood of 
a policy being in place (for literature on interest group influence, see, for 
example, Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009; Bunea, 
2013; Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2015; Klüver, 2013; Mahoney, 2008). 
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If engagement in associations in favor of a policy is positively correlated 
with public support for a policy, the strength of the relationship between 
public support and policy might be overestimated if we do not take into 
account that associations lobbying alongside the public might “help” the 
public obtain its preferences.
We therefore construct a variable measuring the proportion of respondents 
who are engaged in associations that support a policy in a country. If the 
association type that we linked to the policy issue is against the policy (e.g., 
animal rights organizations are against allowing experiments on animals), the 
variable takes a negative value. If several associations with opposing views 
are linked to an issue, the engagement levels are subtracted from one another 
so that the variable indicates the amount of net associational policy support. 
Similar approaches have been taken in recent studies of responsiveness to 
public opinion on specific policy issues (Gilens, 2012; Gilens & Page, 2014; 
Lax & Phillips, 2012). By identifying interest groups expected to be the most 
powerful in the policy processes, these studies examine whether policy is 
more likely to get adopted when it enjoys support by powerful interest groups. 
All independent variables are grand mean centered.
Analysis and Results
As the policy measure has three ordered but noninterval levels, we use 
ordered logit regression. The unit of analysis—a policy in a country—is 
clustered within both issues and countries, meaning that the variance in the 
policy status and in the relationship between public opinion and policy 
might be partially accounted for by both dimensions. To test whether this is 
the case and whether we consequently need to account for the clusters in our 
models, we first estimate two multilevel ordered logit regression models 
with public opinion as the only independent variable and random intercept 
and slope components at the country and the issue level, respectively (Table 2, 
Models 1 and 2). Both models show that public support for a policy is posi-
tively and significantly related to the likelihood of the policy being in place. 
Moreover, we find that the random variance components are extremely 
small in the model with countries as compared with the model with issues at 
the higher level. The Likelihood Ratio tests comparing the two models with 
the equivalent model without random variance components suggest that the 
multilevel model with issues at Level 2 has a significantly better fit, whereas 
this is not the case for the model with countries at Level 2. The appropriate 
model for our estimations is therefore a multilevel ordered logit model in 
which the intercept and the coefficient of public opinion vary randomly 
across policy issues.
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Next, we examine whether the opinion–policy relationship is influenced by 
engagement in issue-specific associations, controlling for potential effects of 
salience, trust, electoral system, and year (Model 3). We find a positive and sta-
tistically significant coefficient for the opinion–engagement interaction, sup-
porting our hypothesis. We also observe that the variance of the random slope 
decreases drastically, suggesting that the strength of associations interested in a 
policy issue plays an important part in determining how strongly policy is 
related to public support for it. Neither the media salience of a policy issue nor 
the level of interpersonal trust in a society or the effective number of parties 
affects the strength of the opinion–policy link. As a robustness check, we also 
estimate the models with the alternative, MIP-based salience measure, which 
does not provide evidence for a conditioning effect either (Online Appendix C). 
Meanwhile, the negative interaction between year and public opinion indicates 
a weakening in the relationship between opinion and policy over time.7
We then test whether we obtain a similar result if we replace the issue-spe-
cific associational engagement measure with the general engagement measure. 
Indeed, the coefficient of the interaction with public opinion is positive and 
significant (Model 4). However, when we test both moderating effects in the 
same model, we find that only engagement in issue-specific associations sig-
nificantly affects the opinion–policy link, whereas the interaction between gen-
eral associational engagement and opinion becomes insignificant (Model 5). 
This finding suggests that it is indeed engagement in associations concerned 
with the specific issue that strengthens the link between policy and public opin-
ion and not the overall level of associational engagement in a society.
Finally, we estimate the interaction between public opinion and specific 
associational engagement while controlling for the net associational policy 
support. The purpose is to rule out that the relationship between opinion and 
policy is explained by interest advocacy through civil society groups that 
hold the same policy views as the public. As Model 6 shows, the likelihood 
of a policy being in place indeed increases with the net strength of civil soci-
ety engagement in favor of it. At the same time, the relationship between 
public opinion and policy remains positive and significant with the variables 
with which public opinion is interacted at their grand means. Importantly, the 
positive effect of associational engagement on the opinion–policy link also 
remains statistically significant. This underlines that associations play a role 
not only by increasing the likelihood of policy being in place in cases where 
they favor a given policy but also by increasing correspondence between 
public opinion and policy irrespective of whether their advocacy efforts coin-
cide with the view of the majority of the public.8
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate how engagement in issue-specific civil society 
associations conditions the opinion–policy relationship. Figure 1 shows the 
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average marginal effect of public opinion across the observed range of values 
on the logged scale of associational engagement. The higher the associational 
engagement, the stronger the positive association between public support and 
the probability of having the policy in place. Likewise, the higher the engage-
ment, the stronger the negative association between public support and the 
probability of no policy being in place. The effect of public opinion on the 
likelihood of the policy being partially in place is relatively stable at all levels 
of engagement. The graphs also show the distribution of associational 
engagement values through the histograms and rug plots.
Figure 2 illustrates how the predicted probabilities of the three policy lev-
els vary with public policy support at low and high levels of specific associa-
tional engagement. In contexts where associational engagement is at one 
standard deviation below the mean (a cumulative engagement level of 2.6%), 
the probability of policy being in place or not in place essentially remains 
stable with increases in public support. In contrast, when associational 
engagement is at one standard deviation above the mean (18.4%), a shift 
from no to full public support is associated with an increase from 3% to 91% 
probability that the policy is in place. This clearly shows that the link between 
public opinion and policy is stronger in contexts with higher levels of engage-
ment in issue-relevant civil society organizations.
Conclusion
The representation of the policy preferences of the public in policy outcomes 
is one of the core principles of representative democracy (Dahl, 1989). Which 
conditions and factors strengthen the link between public opinion and policy 
have therefore been on the minds of political scientists for decades. Yet, 
whereas their recent research has put high emphasis on the conditioning roles 
of political institutions and issue salience (e.g., Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008; 
Lax & Phillips, 2009, 2012; Rasmussen, Reher, & Toshkov, 2018; Wlezien & 
Soroka, 2012), the potential role of civil society organizations has received 
sparse attention. At the same time, social movements and engagement in vol-
untary associations have long been central objects of sociological studies, 
while the role of public opinion in affecting policy shifts has received less 
attention here (McAdam & Su, 2002).
Linking insights from these two bodies of literature, our focus in this arti-
cle was on how engagement in voluntary associations might exert a positive 
influence on policy representation by facilitating the transmission of infor-
mation between the public and policy makers. Specifically, we argued that 
associations whose purposes and goals are related to a policy issue inform the 
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public about the issue and the policy debate around it while transmitting cues 
about public preferences to policy makers. Consequently, decision makers 
should both be better able to make policy choices in line with public opinion 
and be incentivized to do so as the public has more resources to monitor their 
actions closely. Our analysis, based on data on public opinion, policy, and 
associational engagement on 20 policy issues in 30 European countries, sup-
ports this hypothesis.
By disaggregating the overall level of associational involvement of a citi-
zenry and focusing on issue-specific associations, we recognize that associa-
tions have different purposes and are unlikely to provide information about 
issues outside their realm of interests. Some scholars have suggested that 
associational engagement improves representation and accountability by 
increasing the public’s general knowledge about politics as “more social 
interaction leads to more political discussion” (cf. also Coleman, 1988; 
Jottier & Heyndels, 2012). Yet, we find that the positive effect of overall 
engagement in voluntary associations on the link between opinion and pol-
icy on specific issues disappears when we introduce our measure of the 
strength of issue-specific associations into the model. This suggests that the 
capacity of voluntary associations to benefit democracy might be more lim-
ited than is often thought, at least with respect to the quality of policy repre-
sentation. At the same time, our findings suggest that the role of civil society 
organizations in public policy goes beyond their lobbying efforts with which 
they aim to convince decision makers of policies that are in the interests of 
their members.
As the study focused on the consequences of civil society engagement 
rather than its origins, our results do not preclude the possibility that associa-
tional engagement is stimulated by political leaders (see, for example, 
Maloney, Smith, & Stoker, 2000). This means that the positive effect it has 
on policy representation may to some degree reflect a demand by represen-
tatives for information about public opinion. By the same token, citizens 
might mobilize in civil society organizations precisely because they hope to 
increase policy responsiveness in their issue area of concern. We thus need 
not conceive of associations as an independent force that influences the link 
between citizens and elites. What our findings suggest instead is that, regard-
less of the precise reasons for the existence and strength of civil society 
organizations in a policy area, they appear to act as important vehicles for 
distributing information and reducing uncertainty between the citizens and 
the decision makers and thus help stimulate correspondence between opin-
ion and policy.
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This might then imply that political elites can actively contribute to clos-
ing the gap between opinion and policy, either more generally or in particular 
issue areas. Exchanges with civil society organizations may be facilitated 
both through durable institutions like in corporatist systems and in an ad hoc 
manner. Associations themselves may also enhance representation by pro-
moting civil society engagement, for instance, through running advocacy 
campaigns. Meanwhile, citizens might be able to improve the responsiveness 
and accountability of policy makers on specific issues by deliberately joining 
associations on either side of a policy debate.
Future endeavors should extend our analysis through longitudinal designs 
that would allow examining the dynamic relationship between changes in 
associational engagement and policy representation. This will also provide 
insight into how the impact of associational engagement varies at different 
stages of policy-making processes. There is moreover scope for future research 
to include information about additional aspects of associational life, for exam-
ple the resources, management, membership dialogue, and political activities 
of the associations active on an issue. Such factors are likely to be important 
for the extent to which voluntary associations can act as information transmis-
sion belts between voters and political elites. Linking these data to the demo-
graphic and socioeconomic composition of the membership of organizations 
might also generate insights into the potential role of associations in alleviat-
ing or reinforcing inequalities in policy representation. The large-scale public 
opinion surveys on which we relied in this study do not contain such informa-
tion and it is beyond our scope to map such detailed information for all active 
voluntary associations on 20 issues within 30 countries. However, our analysis 
provides an important stepping stone for research that can complement our 
macro-level approach by conducting detailed studies of associational engage-
ment for specific policy areas and/or countries over time.
Appendix. Policy Issues, Year, Survey, and Number of Countries Covered.
Policy issue Survey item Year Survey
No. of 
countries
Warnings on 
alcoholic drink 
bottles
“Would you agree or disagree 
to put warnings on alcohol 
bottles with the purpose to 
warn pregnant women and 
drivers of dangers of drinking 
alcohol?”
2009 EB 72.3 26
(continued)
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Policy issue Survey item Year Survey
No. of 
countries
Experiments on 
animals
“Scientists should be allowed 
to experiment on animals like 
dogs and monkeys if this can 
help sort out human health 
problems”
2010 EB 73.1 30
Smoking bans in 
bars
“Are you in favour of smoking 
bans in the following places? 
Bars, pubs and clubs”
2008 Flash 
EB 253
27
Tobacco 
vending 
machines
“Banning the sales of tobacco 
products through vending 
machines”
2012 EB 77.1 26
Embryonic stem 
cell research
“Research involving human 
embryos should be forbidden, 
even if this means that possible 
treatments are not made 
available to ill people”
2010 EB 73.1 30
Nuclear power “Are you totally in favour, [. . .] 
or totally opposed to energy 
production by nuclear power 
stations?”
2008 EB 69.1 26
Nationwide 
minimum wage
“A minimum reasonable wage 
should be guaranteed in 
(OUR COUNTRY), even if 
this would lead to fewer jobs 
available.”
2010 EB 74.1 26
Support for 
caregivers
“The state should pay an income 
to those who have to give 
up working or reduce their 
working time to care for a 
dependent [elderly] person”
2007 EB 67.3 27
Detaining 
terrorist 
suspects 
without charge
“Suppose the government 
suspected that a terrorist act 
was about to happen. Do you 
think the authorities should 
have the right to detain people 
for as long as they want 
without putting them on trial?”
2005-
2008
ISSP 
2006
18
Same-sex 
marriage
“Same-sex marriages should be 
prohibited by law.”
2009 EES 
2009
26
Table 1. (continued)
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Policy issue Survey item Year Survey
No. of 
countries
Adoption by 
same-sex 
couples
“Homosexual couples should be 
able to adopt children”
2008-
2009
EVS 
2008
30
Abortion “Women should be free to 
decide on matters of abortion.”
2009 EES 
2009
26
Citizenship “Children born in [COUNTRY] 
of parents who are not 
citizens should have the right 
to become [COUNTRY 
NATIONALITY] citizens.”
2003-
2005
ISSP 
2003
20
Progressive tax “Do you think people with high 
incomes should pay a larger 
share of their income in taxes 
than those with low incomes, 
the same share, or a smaller 
share?”
1998-
2001
ISSP 
1999
16
Right to earn 
while receiving 
a pension
“Pensioners should be allowed 
to earn as much as they want 
on top of their pension.”
2001 EB 56.1 16
Asylum seekers’ 
right to work
“While their applications for 
refugee status are being 
considered, people should 
be allowed to work in 
[COUNTRY]”
2002-
2003
ESS 1 21
Online voting “On-line voting should be used 
for elections and referenda”
2001 EB 54.2 16
Military in 
Afghanistan
“Send [NATIONALITY] troops 
to fight with the U.S. forces?”
2001 Flash 
EB 114
15
Mandatory 
retirement age
“Would you say that people 
should be allowed to continue 
working once they have 
reached the official retirement 
age, or should they have to 
stop working?”
2011 EB 76.2 29
Disposal of 
plastic waste in 
landfills
“Disposing of plastic waste 
in landfill sites should be 
prohibited”
2013 Flash 
EB 388
27
EB = Eurobarometer; ISSP = International Social Survey Program; EES = European Election 
Study; EVS = European Values Study; ESS = European Social Survey
Table 1. (continued)
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Notes
1. A related set of studies examines the role of electoral systems on representation 
by focusing on citizen-elite congruence on the left–right dimension (e.g., Powell, 
2009; Blais & Bodet, 2006; Dalton, 2017; Golder & Stramski, 2010).
2. The 20 policy issues are listed in Table 1. Within the constraints of data avail-
ability, we aimed at obtaining as comprehensive a sample of European countries 
as possible. The 30 countries are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
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Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and United Kingdom.
3. Rasmussen, Reher, and Toshkov’s (2018) study, which uses the same data on 
public opinion and policy, includes 31 countries. This is reduced to 30 countries 
here because we lack data on social trust from Malta.
4. Eurobarometer 49 (1998), 62.2 (2004), 66.3 (2006), 73.4 (2010), 76.2 (2011); 
European Values Study 1999, 2008; European Social Survey 1 (2002-2003)
5. Two alternative measures of general associational engagement are described and 
tested in the Online Appendix B. The results confirm the findings presented here.
6. This measure takes the natural logarithm of the media coverage as most policy 
issues are discussed in a small number of articles, whereas only a small subset of 
the issues receive extensive coverage.
7. This might, however, also be due to the sample including more Central and 
Eastern European countries in later years.
8. The interaction terms between public support and associational engagement 
remain statistically significant in all models when excluding one issue and coun-
try, respectively, at a time (see Online Appendix E). The results are thus not 
driven by individual policy issues or countries.
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